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Abstract: The set of optimal matchings in the assignment matrix allows to define a 
reflexive and symmetric binary relation on each side of the market, the equal-partner binary 
relation. The number of equivalence classes of the transitive closure of the equal-partner 
binary relation determines the dimension of the core of the assignment game. This result 
provides an easy procedure to determine the dimension of the core directly from the entries 
of the assignment matrix and shows that the dimension of the core is not as much 
determined by the number of optimal matchings as by their relative position in the 
assignment matrix. 
Key words: assignment game, core, core dimension 
JEL classification: C71, C78 
 
Resum: El conjunt d'assignacions òptimes d'un joc d'assignació ens permet definir una 
relació binària, reflexiva i simètrica, en cada costat del mercat. El nombre de classes 
d'equivalència de la clausura transitiva d'aquesta relació determina la dimensió del core del 
joc. Aquest resultat ens dóna un procediment senzill per determinar la dimensió del core 
d'un joc d'assignació, només a partir de les entrades de la seva matriu. Això mostra que la 
dimensió del core d'aquests mercats depèn no tant del nombre d'assignacions òptimes que 
tenen sinó de la posició relativa d'aquestes assignacions òptimes dins la matriu. 
 
 
 
 
1 Introduction
The assignment game (Shapley and Shubik, 1972) is a cooperative model for a two-
sided market where side payments are allowed. In this market a product that comes
in indivisible units is exchanged for money, and each participant either supplies or
demands exactly one unit. The units need not be alike and the same unit may have
different values for different participants. From these valuations, a matrix can be
written, A = (aij)(i,j)∈M×M ′ , which reflects the profit that can be obtained by each
buyer-seller pair if they trade.
Shapley and Shubik prove that the core of the assignment game is nonempty,
and has a lattice structure. It is a closed and convex polyhedral whose dimension
is typically the cardinality of the short side of the market, but may be less in the
presence of degeneracies, that is, special arithmetical relations among the matrix
entries aij .
The aim of our paper is to characterize the dimension of this core only in terms
of the assignment matrix. To do that, we must identify the aforementioned arith-
metical relations among the matrix entries. In doing so we realize that the dimension
decreases by the existence of arithmetical relations not only among the entries of
the original assignment matrix but also of a related matrix, its buyer-seller exact
representative. The buyer-seller exact representative of a given assignment market
is introduced in Nu´n˜ez and Rafels (2002) as the matrix with the entries as high as
possible among those that define an assignment game with the same core. It is then
no surprising that in the buyer-seller exact representative the number of optimal
matchings might increase. In fact, we will see that the optimal matchings of this
buyer-seller exact representative capture all the arithmetical relations that determine
the dimension of the core. What is important is that all these relations can also be
read from the relative position of the (fewer) optimal matchings of the initial market.
The dimension of the core of an assignment market gives information about how
large the core is and, in some sense, how much variate are the possibilities of coop-
eration in the market. Its parallel in discrete models of matching markets without
monetary transfers might be the computation of the number of stable matchings.
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In this ordinal setting, it remains an open question to find a formula for the max-
imum number of stable matchings as a function of the number of agents of each
type. Thompson (1981) and Balinski and Gale (1987) answer what they consider the
analogous question for the cardinal case. They find an upper bound for the number
of extreme core points as a function of the number of agents of each type:
(
2m
m
)
,
where m is the size of the short side of the market. The dimension of the core is
a complementary measure of how large the core is. Of course, when the number of
extreme points is maximal, the dimension is also as high as it can be. But we may
have a maximal core dimension with less number of extreme core points.
As far as we know, the dimension of the core of an assignment market has not
been studied in depth. There is a result in a very particular case which seems to
relate this problem to the number of optimal matchings: in Sotomayor (2003) it is
proved that if an assignment market has a unique core allocation (a zero-dimensional
core) then it must have more than one optimal matching. But we show in this paper
that the dimension of the core of the assignment game is not as much related to the
number of optimal matchings of the market as to the position of these matchings.
We will argue at the end of the paper that for each possible dimension there is an
upper bound for the number of optimal matchings but, quite surprisingly, with only
two optimal matchings all intermediate core dimensions can be achieved.
To reach our results, we define an equivalence relation on the set of buyers (and
another one on the set of sellers) only depending on the position of the optimal
matchings, and prove that the number of equivalence classes determines the dimension
of the core. In the context of assignment games, also Solymosi and Raghavan (1994)
identify the dimension of some specific sets of payoffs with the number of certain
equivalence classes. What validates our procedure is that our equivalence relation
does not make use of the space of payoffs, that is the core, but only of the original
matrix entries.
In Section 2, the basic concepts regarding the assignment model are recalled. In
Section 3, and given an arbitrary assignment matrix, the equal-partner binary relation
is defined on each side of the market, by means of the set of optimal matchings. Its
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transitive closure, which we name the chained equal-partner equivalence relation, is
analyzed in depth, since it plays an essential role in the results. When the assignment
matrix is doubly dominant diagonal the equal-partner relations are already transitive,
as shown in Section 4. The characterization of the dimension of the core in terms
of the number of equivalence classes of the chained equal-partner relation is proved
in Section 5. The proof of the above result relies on the fact that our equivalence
relation defines the same equivalence classes both on the original market and on its
buyer-seller exact representative. Section 6 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
A two-sided assignment market (M,M ′, A) is defined by a finite set of buyers M of
cardinality |M | = m , a disjoint finite set of sellers M ′ of cardinality |M ′| = m′ , and
a nonnegative matrix A = (aij)(i,j)∈M×M ′ where aij represents the profit obtained
by the mixed–pair (i, j) ∈ M × M ′ if they trade. A square assignment market
(M,M ′, A) is one with as many buyers as sellers.
Given an assignment market (M,M ′, A) we look for an optimal matching between
the two sides of the market. A matching µ ⊆ M × M ′ between M and M ′ is
a bijection from some M0 ⊆ M to some M ′0 ⊆ M ′ such that |M0| = |M ′0| =
min{|M |, |M ′|} . We write (i, j) ∈ µ as well as j = µ(i) and i = µ−1(j) . We denote
the set of matchings between M and M ′ by M(M,M ′) . We say a buyer i ∈M is
not assigned by µ if (i, j) 6∈ µ for all j ∈M ′ (and similarly for sellers).
We say a matching µ ∈M(M,M ′) is optimal for the two-sided market (M,M ′, A)
if for all µ′ ∈ M(M,M ′) , we have ∑(i,j)∈µ aij ≥ ∑(i,j)∈µ′ aij , and denote the set
of optimal matchings by M∗A(M,M ′) . Given S ⊆ M and T ⊆ M ′ , we denote by
M(S, T ) and M∗A(S, T ) the set of matchings and optimal matchings of the submar-
ket (S, T,A|S×T ) defined by the subset S of buyers, the subset T of sellers and the
restriction of A to S × T . If S = ∅ or T = ∅ , then the only possible matching is
µ = ∅ and by convention ∑(i,j)∈∅ aij = 0 .
Shapley and Shubik associate to any assignment market (M,M ′, A) an assign-
ment game (M ∪M ′, wA) where the set of players is the union of the sets of buyers
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and sellers and the characteristic function is defined as follows. Given S ⊆ M and
T ⊆ M ′ , wA(S ∪ T ) = max{
∑
(i,j)∈µ aij | µ ∈ M(S, T )} (notice that a coalition
formed only by sellers or only by buyers has worth zero).
With this definition, they prove that the core, C(wA) , of an arbitrary assignment
game (M ∪M ′, wA) is nonempty and can be represented in terms of any optimal
matching µ ∈ M∗A(M,M ′) . Once fixed any such optimal matching, (u, v) ∈ RM ×
RM ′ is in the core if and only if ui ≥ 0 for all i ∈ M , vj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ M ′ ,
ui+ vj ≥ aij for all (i, j) ∈M ×M ′ , ui+ vj = aij if (i, j) ∈ µ and ui = 0 if i ∈M
is not matched by µ , while vj = 0 if j ∈M ′ is not matched by µ .
Moreover, the core has a lattice structure with two special extreme points: the
buyers–optimal core allocation, (u, v) , where each buyer attains his maximum core
payoff, and the sellers–optimal core allocation, (u, v) , where each seller does.
From Demange (1982) and Leonard (1983) we know that the maximum core payoff
of any player coincides with his or her marginal contribution:
ui = wA(M ∪M ′)− wA((M ∪M ′) \ {i}) for all i ∈M , and
vj = wA(M ∪M ′)− wA((M ∪M ′) \ {j}) for all j ∈M ′.
(1)
From (1), once fixed µ ∈M∗A(M,M ′) , and taking into account that ui+vµ(i) = aiµ(i) ,
since (u, v) ∈ C(wA) , we get that the minimum core payoff of a buyer i who is
matched by µ is
ui = aiµ(i) + wA((M ∪M ′) \ {µ(i)})− wA(M ∪M ′) , (2)
while ui = 0 if i is not assigned by µ . Similarly the minimum core payoff of a seller
j who is matched by µ is
vj = aµ−1(j)j + wA((M ∪M ′) \ {µ−1(j)})− wA(M ∪M ′) . (3)
An assignment game with as many buyers as sellers is such that each agent has
a null minimal core payoff if and only if it has dominant diagonal (Solymosi and
Raghavan, 2001), that is to say, given any µ ∈M∗A(M,M ′) , for all i∗ ∈M , ai∗µ(i∗) ≥
ai∗j for all j ∈M ′ and ai∗µ(i∗) ≥ aiµ(i∗) for all i ∈M .
An agent is said to be active when his or her payoff in the core is not constant,
while non-active agents are those with a constant core payoff.
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Definition 1 Let (M ∪M ′, wA) be an assignment game and let (u, v) and (u, v)
be the sellers-optimal core allocation and the buyers-optimal core allocation. A buyer
i ∈M is active if and only if ui > ui , and a seller j ∈M ′ is active when vj > vj .
Throughout this paper, without loss of generality, we assume that A is square
by adding null rows or columns if necessary. Notice that this does not modify the
dimension of the core.
Given a set X , a binary relation on X is an ordered pair (X,R) where R ⊆
X ×X . For any x, y ∈ X , we denote (x, y) ∈ R by xR y and say that the element
x is related to the element y . A binary relation (X,R) is reflexive if for all x ∈ X
we have xRx ; it is symmetric if for all x, y ∈ X , xR y implies y Rx ; and it is
transitive if for all x, y, z ∈ X , xR y and y R z imply xR z . A binary relation on
X satisfying the three above properties is named an equivalence relation on X . Any
equivalence relation on a set induces a partition of this set by means of its equivalence
classes. For all x ∈ X , the class of x is x¯ = {y ∈ X | y Rx } .
There is a standard procedure to associate to any reflexive and symmetric binary
relation R on X an equivalence relation. This procedure is known as the transitive
closure of R which is denoted by R¯ . For all x, y ∈ X we say x R¯ y if there exist
k1, k2, . . . , kr elements in X such that xR k1 , kiRki+1 for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r− 1}
and kr Ry . The transitive closure represents the minimum that we have to add to a
reflexive and symmetric relation in order to obtain an equivalence relation. Of course,
for any equivalence relation R we have R¯ = R .
3 The chained equal-partner equivalence relation
We introduce two related binary relations on each side of the market (M,M ′, A) .
First, the equal-partner binary relation is defined in such a way that a pair of buyers
(or a pair of sellers) are related if they have the same partner by two optimal match-
ings. The equal-partner relations are reflexive and symmetric but might not be tran-
sitive (see matrix A1 below). We then consider their transitive closures and name
them the chained equal-partner equivalence relations. The chained equal-partner
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equivalence relation is the keystone to determine the dimension of the core of the
assignment market (see Theorem 12). This is the reason why we begin studying its
properties.
Definition 2 Let (M,M ′, A) be a square assignment market. The chained equal-
partner equivalence relation R¯A on the set of buyers is the transitive closure of the
relation RA on M defined by: for i1, i2 ∈ M , i1RAi2 if and only if there exist
µ1, µ2 ∈M∗A(M,M ′) such that µ1(i1) = µ2(i2) .
Similarly, the chained equal-partner binary relation R¯′A on the set of sellers is
the transitive closure of the relation R′A on M
′ defined by: for j1, j2 ∈M ′ , j1R′Aj2
if and only if µ−11 (j1) = µ
−1
2 (j2) for some µ1, µ2 ∈M∗A(M,M ′) .
We name RA and R
′
A the equal-partner relations on M and M
′ respectively.
Assuming that the assignment matrix is square and taking into account that then
each optimal matching is a bijection between M and M ′ , reflexiveness of these
relations follows easily. These relations are also symmetric by definition, but may fail
to be transitive. For this reason, we add to each equal-partner relation those pairs
that are connected by a chain of agents on their same side of the market such that
each two consecutive agents on the chain have a common partner by some pair of
optimal matchings. This completion leads to the equivalence relations R¯A and R¯
′
A .
We denote by IA1 , I
A
2 , ..., I
A
r the equivalence classes of R¯A and by J
A
1 , J
A
2 , ...,
JAs the equivalence classes of R¯
′
A .
The number of equivalence classes is a relevant information for our purposes.
This number does not depend as much on the number of optimal matchings as on
the relative position of these optimal matchings. To argue this point, let us consider
the following two assignment markets with four agents on each side:
1’ 2’ 3’ 4’
A1 :
1
2
3
4
1 0 0 1
1 1 0 0
0 1 1 0
0 0 1 1
and
1’ 2’ 3’ 4’
A2 :
1
2
3
4
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1
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Both markets have two optimal matchings. The market defined by matrix A2 has
one optimal matching placed on the main diagonal and the other one on the secondary
diagonal. For matrix A1 one optimal matching is also on the main diagonal while
the other one is placed just below it and in the up-right corner.
The equal-partner binary relation RA1 is not transitive: 1RA12 and 2RA13 , but
buyer 1 is not related to buyer 3 by RA1 . However, transitivity holds for the relation
RA2 , that is RA2 = R¯A2 .
Moreover, despite the fact that both matrices have the same number of optimal
matchings, their corresponding chained equal-partner equivalence relations define dif-
ferent sets of equivalence classes. The equivalence relation R¯A1 defined on M has
only one equivalence class, IA11 = {1, 2, 3, 4} (similarly, R¯′A1 has only one equiva-
lence class that is JA11 = {1′, 2′, 3′, 4′} ), while R¯A2 defines two equivalence classes,
IA21 = {1, 4} and IA22 = {2, 3} (and similarly JA21 = {1′, 4′} and JA22 = {2′, 3′} are
the equivalence classes of R¯′A2 ).
Next proposition states that, as it happens in the matrices above, each equivalence
class in M is mapped onto the same equivalence class in M ′ by any of the possible
optimal matchings.
Proposition 3 Let (M,M ′, A) be a square assignment market and let {IAp }rp=1 and
{JAq }sq=1 be the equivalence classes of the chained equal-partner relations R¯A and
R¯′A , respectively. Then,
1. r = s and
2. for all p ∈ {1, . . . , r} there exists a unique q ∈ {1, . . . , s} such that, for all
µ ∈M∗A(M,M ′) , µ(IAp ) = JAq .
Proof: Statement 1) follows from statement 2) and the fact that µ is a bijection.
To prove statement 2), let us take an equivalence class IAp of R¯A and choose any
element i0 ∈ IAp . Choose also an optimal matching µ∗ ∈ M∗A(M,M ′) and take
q ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s} such that µ∗(i0) ∈ JAq . Notice that for all other µ ∈ M∗A(M,M ′) ,
µ(i0)R
′
Aµ
∗(i0) and thus
µ(i0) ∈ JAq for all µ ∈M∗A(M,M ′) . (4)
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We will first prove that µ(IAp ) ⊆ JAq for all µ ∈ M∗A(M,M ′) . Take i ∈ IAp ,
i 6= i0 and let us see that µ(i) ∈ JAq for all µ ∈ M∗A(M,M ′) . Since i0RAi , there
exist i1, i2, . . . , ik ∈M such that i0RAi1 , i1RAi2 , . . ., ikRAi . From i0RAi1 follows
that there exist µ0, µ1 ∈ M∗A(M,M ′) with µ0(i0) = µ1(i1) which implies, by (4),
µ1(i1) ∈ JAq and consequently, since µ1(i1)R′Aµ(i1) for all µ ∈ M∗A(M,M ′) , we
obtain µ(i1) ∈ JAq for all µ ∈ M∗A(M,M ′) . By repeating the same argument, we
iteratively obtain that µ(i2), µ(i3), . . . , µ(ik) and µ(i) belong to J
A
q for all µ ∈
M∗A(M,M ′) .
Let us check now that JAq ⊆ µ(IAp ) for all µ ∈ M∗A(M,M ′) . Take j ∈ JAq and
any µ ∈M∗A(M,M ′) . From µ(i0) ∈ JAq it follows that there exist j1, j2, . . . , jk ∈M ′
such that µ(i0)R
′
Aj1 , j1R
′
Aj2 ,. . ., jkR
′
Aj . Since µ(i0)R
′
Aj1 , there exist i1 ∈ M and
µ0, µ1 ∈ M∗A(M,M ′) such that i1 = µ−10 (j1) = µ−11 (µ(i0)) . Then, µ1(i1) = µ(i0)
which means that i1RAi0 and consequently i1 ∈ IAp . Moreover, µ0(i1) = j1 =
µ(µ−1(j1)) , and this implies that i1RAµ−1(j1) , that is to say µ−1(j1) ∈ IAp or,
equivalently, j1 ∈ µ(IAp ) . By repeatedly applying the same argument we obtain
j2, . . . , jk and j also belong to µ(I
A
p ) for all µ ∈M∗A(M,M ′) . 2
As a consequence of this lemma, from now on the equivalence classes will be
numbered in such a way that µ(IAk ) = J
A
k , for all k = {1, 2, . . . , r} . Notice that cor-
responding equivalence classes on both sides of the market have the same cardinality.
Moreover, each equivalence class of R¯A and R¯
′
A consists of either only active
agents or only non-active agents (see Definition 1).
Lemma 4 Let (M ∪M ′, wA) be a square assignment game and let {IAk }rk=1 be the
equivalence classes of R¯A , while {JAk }rk=1 are the equivalence classes of R¯′A .
1. If i0 ∈ IAk is active, then all i ∈ IAk are active.
2. If j0 ∈ JAk is active, then all j ∈ JAk are active.
Proof: Assume on the contrary that i0 ∈ IAk is active and i1 ∈ IAk is non-active.
Then i0R¯Ai1 . Assume without loss of generality that i0RAi1 . Then there exist
µ1, µ2 ∈ M∗A(M,M ′) such that µ1(i0) = µ2(i1) = j . Since (u, v) ∈ C(wA) , this
means that ui1 + vj = ai1j and ui0 + vj = ai0j , and if we substitute vj from the first
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equation into the second one, we get ui0 + (ai1j − ui1) = ai0j . Taking into account
that ui1 = ui1 , since i1 is a non-active agent, and (u, v) ∈ C(wA) , we obtain
ai0j = ui0 + (ai1j − ui1) = ui0 + vj . (5)
Moreover, from (u, v) ∈ C(wA) , we also have that ui0 + vj = ai0j and together with
equation (5) it follows that ui0 = ui0 , which contradicts i0 being active. The proof
of statement 2) is similar and thus left to the reader. 2
In addition to this, any optimal partner of an active agent must also be active
(if µ(i0) is non-active, then from ai0µ(i0) = ui0 + vµ(i0) = ui0 + vµ(i0) and ai0µ(i0) =
ui0 + vµ(i0) follows i0 is non-active). Similarly, an optimal partner of a non-active
buyer is also non-active. Thus, if IAk is a class of active (non-active) buyers, µ(I
A
k )
is a class of active (non-active) sellers, for any µ ∈M∗A(M,M ′) .
From the lemma above, we have the same number of classes of active (non-active)
agents on each side of the market. We delay until Corollary 11 in Section 5 the proof
of the fact that the non-active agents on each side of the market form a unique equiv-
alence class. This is obtained there as a straightforward consequence of Proposition
8.
The partition in equivalence classes has some consequences on the structure of the
core. We see now that the payoffs to two buyers on the same class have a constant
difference in all core allocation. A similar statement could be done for the sellers.
Lemma 5 Let (M ∪M ′, wA) be a square assignment game and let {IAk }rk=1 be the
equivalence classes of R¯A .
1. If i1, i2 ∈ IAk for some k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r} , then ui1 −ui2 is constant in C(wA) .
2. If i1, i2 ∈ IAk for some k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r} , then, for all µ ∈ M∗A(M,M ′) ,
ui1 + vµ(i2) is constant in C(wA) .
Proof: 1) First, if i1RAi2 , there exist µ1, µ2 ∈ M∗A(M,M ′) such that µ1(i1) =
µ2(i2) . This implies that for all (u, v) ∈ C(wA) , ui1 + vµ1(i1) = ai1µ1(i1) and ui2 +
vµ2(i2) = ai2µ2(i2) and, as a consequence, ui1 − ui2 = ai1µ1(i1) − ai2µ2(i2) . Secondly,
if i1R¯Ai2 , there exist k1, k2, . . . , kr ∈ M such that i1RAk1 , k1RAk2 , . . ., krRAi2 .
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Then we can write ui1 − ui2 = (ui1 − uk1) + (uk1 − uk2) + · · ·+ (ukr − ui2) and since
each of these differences is constant in C(wA) we obtain that ui1 − ui2 is constant
in C(wA) .
2) By part 1), ui1 − ui2 is constant in C(wA) . Then, ui1 + vµ(i2) = ui2 + vµ(i2) +
(ui1 − ui2) = ai2µ(i2) + (ui1 − ui2) is also constant in C(wA) . 2
The above lemma shows that the equivalence relations R¯A and R¯
′
A imply some
connection between the core payoffs of some agents and thus it is not surprising that
these equivalence classes turn out to determine the dimension of the core. In fact,
the converse of statement (1) in the above lemma also holds, that is, if two buyers
have a constant difference of payoffs in all core allocation, then they belong to the
same class. But this will be seen in Corollary 10 as a consequence of a main result
of Section 5 that states that the equivalence classes remain invariant among all the
assignment markets with the same core. Before reaching this point, we must analyze
those assignment markets where the equal partner relation is already transitive, with
no need of considering its transitive closure R¯A .
4 The doubly dominant diagonal case
An assignment game (M ∪M ′, wA) with as many buyers as sellers has doubly domi-
nant diagonal (Solymosi and Raghavan, 2001) if and only if, for any µ ∈M∗A(M,M ′) ,
aij + akµ(k) ≥ aiµ(k)+ akj for all i, j, k ∈M 2. This definition does not depend on the
chosen optimal matching µ ∈M∗A(M,M ′) . In Nu´n˜ez and Rafels (2002) it is proved
that, for a square assignment game, having doubly dominant diagonal is equivalent to
being buyer-seller exact, that is to say, to satisfying that each matrix entry is attained
in some core allocation: for all i ∈ M and all j ∈ M ′ there exists (u, v) ∈ C(wA)
such that ui + vj = aij . Thus, if a square assignment game has doubly dominant
diagonal, no matrix entry can be raised without modifying the core of the game.
2The names of dominant diagonal and doubly dominant diagonal make more sense if the optimal
matching is placed on the diagonal of the assignment matrix. But since these two properties of the
matrix characterize properties of the core of the game, and the core does not depend on the selected
optimal matching, they can be stated in terms of any optimal matching.
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We are now interested in some additional properties of the core of an assignment
game with doubly dominant diagonal in relation with the defined equivalence classes.
The next technical lemma shows that in a buyer-seller exact assignment game, or an
assignment game with doubly dominant diagonal, if one core constraint is tight at all
core allocations, then the corresponding mixed-pair coalition must be paired in some
optimal matching. In fact, all mixed-pair (i, j) ∈ IAk × JAk belongs to some optimal
matching.
Lemma 6 Let (M ∪M ′, wA) be a square assignment game with doubly dominant
diagonal, and let {IAk }rk=1 and {JAk }rk=1 be the equivalence classes of R¯A and R¯′A
respectively. Then the following statements are equivalent:
1. (i, j) ∈ IAk × JAk for some k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r} .
2. ui + vj = aij for all (u, v) ∈ C(wA) .
3. There exists µ ∈M∗A(M,M ′) such that (i, j) ∈ µ .
Proof: The implication 3) ⇒ 1) follows easily since if j = µ(i) and i belongs to
some class IAk , then, by Lemma 3, µ(i) belongs to µ(I
A
k ) = J
A
k . As for 1) ⇒ 2) ,
if (i, j) ∈ IAk × JAk we have that, once fixed µ ∈ M∗A(M,M ′) , j = µ(i′) for some
i′ ∈ IAk . Then, by Lemma 5, ui + vµ(i′) = ui + vj is constant in C(wA) . Now, since
(M ∪M ′, wA) is buyer-seller exact, ui + vj = aij for all (u, v) ∈ C(wA) .
It only remains to prove 2) ⇒ 3) . Assume ui + vj = aij for all (u, v) ∈ C(wA)
and take some µ ∈ M∗A(M,M ′) . If (i, j) ∈ µ we are done. If (i, j) 6∈ µ , consider
then µ(i) ∈M ′ and µ−1(j) ∈M . Then,
ui + vµ(i) + uµ−1(j) + vj = aiµ(i) + aµ−1(j)j , for all (u, v) ∈ C(wA)
and together with ui+vj = aij for all (u, v) ∈ C(wA) it follows that uµ−1(j)+vµ(i) =
aiµ(i) + aµ−1(j)j − aij for all (u, v) ∈ C(wA) . This means that uµ−1(j) + vµ(i) is
also constant in C(wA) , but, since A is buyer-seller exact, we know that there
exists (u′, v′) ∈ C(wA) such that u′µ−1(j) + v′µ(i) = aµ−1(j)µ(i) . As a consequence,
aiµ(i) + aµ−1(j)j − aij = aµ−1(j)µ(i) .
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We can now define a new matching
µ′ = {(i, j), (µ−1(j), µ(i))} ∪ {(k, µ(k)) | for all k ∈M, k 6= i, k 6= µ−1(j)}
and prove it is optimal for A , since∑
k∈M
akµ(k) = aiµ(i) + aµ−1(j)j +
∑
k∈M\{i,µ−1(j)}
akµ(k)
= aij + aµ−1(j)µ(i) +
∑
k∈M\{i,µ−1(j)}
akµ(k) =
∑
k∈M
akµ′(k) .
Since (i, j) ∈ µ′ , the proof is finished. 2
A consequence of the above lemma is that, when the assignment game has doubly
dominant diagonal, the equal-partner relation RA is already transitive, and there is
no need of the transitive closure.
Theorem 7 Let (M ∪ M ′, wA) be a square assignment game. If A has doubly
dominant diagonal, then the equal-partner binary relation is transitive, that is, R¯A =
RA .
Proof: Let us see that under the assumption that A is doubly dominant diagonal, if
i1, i2 ∈M satisfy i1R¯Ai2 , then i1RAi2 . From i1R¯Ai2 follows that i1, i2 belong to the
same equivalence class IAk , for some k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r} . Take some µ ∈M∗A(M,M ′) ,
and consider j1 = µ(i1) . Now, (i2, j1) belongs to I
A
k × JAk , and then, from Lemma
6, we know there exists µ′ ∈ M∗A(M,M ′) such that (i2, j1) ∈ µ′ . Thus, µ(i1) =
j1 = µ
′(i2) , which means i1RAi2 . 2
To have a doubly dominant diagonal is a sufficient condition for the transitivity
of RA , but it is not necessary. Consider the matrix
A:
1’ 2’ 3’
1
2
3
1 1 0
0 1 1
1 0 1
and notice that RA is transitive although A does not have a doubly dominant
diagonal, since a13 + a22 = 1 < a12 + a23 = 2 .
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It is proved in Nu´n˜ez and Rafels (2002) that for all assignment game (M∪M ′, wA)
there exists a unique buyer-seller exact assignment game with the same core. This is
denoted by (M ∪M ′, wAr) , it is named the buyer-seller exact representative of the
initial game, and it is defined by
arij = max
(u,v)∈C(wA)
ui + vj , for all (i, j) ∈M ×M ′ . (6)
Moreover, any matching that is optimal for A is also optimal for Ar , but Ar may
have more optimal matchings than A . It follows that (M ∪M ′, wA) is buyer-seller
exact if and only if A = Ar .
Since C(wA) = C(wAr) , both markets have the same core dimension and thus
the buyer-seller exact representative will be crucial to determine the dimension of
C(wA) .
Once fixed any optimal matching µ ∈ M∗A(M,M ′) , and being |M | = |M ′| , the
entries in matrix Ar can be obtained in two different ways. The first one (see p. 430
in Nu´n˜ez and Rafels, 2002) makes use of the characteristic function of the assignment
game and it is useful to be applied to numerical examples:
arij = aiµ(i) + aµ−1(j)j + wA(M ∪M ′ \ {µ−1(j), µ(i)})− wA(M ∪M ′) . (7)
The second way to obtain the buyer-seller exact representative Ar , which can also
be found in the paper cited above, is of a more theoretical nature and only makes
use of the matrix entries: arij = max{aij, a˜ij} , where, for all (i, j) ∈M ×M ′ ,
a˜ij = max
k1,k2,...,kr∈M\{i,j}
different
{aiµ(k1) + ak1µ(k2) + · · ·+ akrj − (ak1µ(k1) + · · ·+ akrµ(kr))} . (8)
This means that each mixed-pair coalition {i, j} evaluates what it could achieve by
cooperating with some optimally matched pairs on the basis that these pairs will be
paid what they obtain in the fixed optimal matching, and then takes the maximum
between this worth and aij . Expression (8) will be useful in the proof of Proposition
8.
Since the buyer-seller exact representative Ar is doubly dominant diagonal, by
Theorem 7 its equal-partner binary relation is already transitive, R¯Ar = RAr . Also,
by Lemma 6 it is easy to identify by means of its equivalence classes which core
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constraints are tight at all core allocations and, as a consequence, the dimension of
C(wAr) . In the next section we see that also the chained equal-partner equivalence
relation R¯A of the initial assignment game determines the dimension of its core.
5 The dimension of the core
As announced before, the dimension of the core of the assignment market will be
determined by the number of equivalence classes of the chained equal-partner relation.
We have seen in the previous section that, for the buyer-seller exact representative
Ar , the equal-partner relation is already transitive. However, to use the equal-partner
relation of Ar to characterize the dimension of C(wA) we first need to prove that
both games not only have the same core but also the same set of equivalence classes.
Proposition 8 Let (M ∪ M ′, wA) and (M ∪ M ′, wB) be two square assignment
games. If C(wA) = C(wB) , then R¯A = R¯B and R¯
′
A = R¯
′
B .
Proof: From expression (6) follows that two assignment games with the same core
have the same buyer-seller exact representative. Thus, it is enough to prove that, if
(M ∪M ′, wAr) is the buyer-seller exact representative of (M ∪M ′, wA) , then for all
i1, i2 ∈ M , i1R¯Ai2 if and only if i1R¯Ari2 ; and similarly, for all j1, j2 ∈ M ′ , j1R¯′Aj2
if and only if j1R¯
′
Arj2 . We only prove the first statement above since the second
one is proved analogously. The “only if” part is straightforward since any optimal
matching for A is also optimal for Ar . Let us then prove the “if” part.
Assume i1, i2 ∈ M with i1R¯Ari2 and not i1R¯Ai2 . This means that i1 and i2
belong to two different equivalence classes of M by the relation R¯A . By Lemma 5,
given µ ∈ M∗A(M,M ′) , and taking into account that M∗A(M,M ′) ⊆M∗Ar(M,M ′) ,
we get that ui1 + vµ(i2) is constant in C(wAr) .
Now, since Ar is buyer seller exact, this means that there exists (u, v) ∈ C(wAr)
such that ui1 + vµ(i2) = a
r
i1µ(i2)
. But we have just seen that ui1 + vµ(i2) is constant
in C(wAr) and thus, ui1 + vµ(i2) = a
r
i1µ(i2)
for all (u, v) ∈ C(wAr) . Recall (8) for the
expression of ari1µ(i2) in terms of the assignment matrix.
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Case 1: If ari1µ(i2) = ai1µ(i2) , then from ui1 + vµ(i1)+ ui2 + vµ(i2) = ai1µ(i1)+ ai2µ(i2) we
obtain
ui2 + vµ(i1) = ai1µ(i1) + ai2µ(i2) − ai1µ(i2) , (9)
which shows that ui2+vµ(i1) is also constant for all core allocation of (M ∪M ′, wAr) .
Thus, for all (u, v) ∈ C(wAr) ,
ui2 + vµ(i1) = a
r
i2µ(i1)
. (10)
By (8) it may happen that ari2µ(i1) = ai2µ(i1) and then, by substitution in (9)
ai1µ(i1) + ai2µ(i2) = ai1µ(i2) + ai2µ(i1) . This means that µ
′ = {(i1, µ(i2)), (i2, µ(i1))} ∪
{(i, µ(i)) | i ∈ M \ {i1, i2}} is also optimal for A and since µ(i1) = µ′(i2) we get
i1RAi2 , in contradiction with the assumption.
If ari2µ(i1) 6= ai2µ(i1) , again by (8) we know that there exist k1, k2, . . . , kr ∈ M \
{i1, i2} and different such that ari2µ(i1) = ai2µ(k1) + ak1µ(k2) + · · ·+ akrµ(i1) − ak1µ(k1) −
ak2µ(k2) − · · · − akrµ(kr) . By substitution in (10), and taking into account (9), we get
ai2µ(k1) + ak1µ(k2) + · · ·+ akrµ(i1) + ai1µ(i2) =
ai1µ(i1) + ai2µ(i2) + ak1µ(k1) + · · ·+ akrµ(kr) .
(11)
As a consequence, the matching
µ′ = {(i2, µ(k1)), (k1, µ(k2)), (k2, µ(k3)), . . . , (kr, µ(i1)), (i1, µ(i2))}
∪{(i, µ(i)) | i ∈M \ {i1, i2, k1, k2, . . . , kr}}
is also optimal for A .
Now, since µ′(i1) = µ(i2) , we get i1R¯Ai2 , in contradiction with the assumption.
Case 2: If ari1µ(i2) 6= ai1µ(i2) , then by (8) we have that for all (u, v) ∈ C(wAr)
ui1+vµ(i2) = a
r
i1µ(i2)
= ai1µ(k1)+ak1µ(k2)+· · ·+akrµ(i2)−ak1µ(k1)−ak2µ(k2)−· · ·−akrµ(kr)
for some k1, k2, . . . , kr ∈M \ {i1, i2} and different.
As a consequence, for all (u, v) ∈ C(wA) ,
ui1 + vµ(i2) = ai1µ(k1) +
r−1∑
j=1
akjµ(kj+1) + akrµ(i2) −
(
r∑
j=1
(ukj + vµ(kj))
)
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and then,
ui1 + vµ(i2) +
r∑
j=1
(ukj + vµ(kj)) = ai1µ(k1) +
r−1∑
j=1
akjµ(kj+1) + akrµ(i2) .
Since ui1 + vµ(k1) ≥ ai1µ(k1) , ukr + vµ(i2) ≥ akrµ(i2) and ukj + vµ(kj+1) ≥ akjµ(kj+1) for
all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r− 1} , we obtain that all these core constraints are tight at all core
allocations. To unify notation let us write (k˜0, k˜1, . . . , k˜r, k˜r+1) = (i1, k1, . . . , kr, i2) .
Then, since i1 = k˜0 and i2 = k˜r+1 belong to different equivalence classes by the
relation R¯A , there must be two consecutive buyers in this chain (k˜0, k˜1, . . . , k˜r, k˜r+1)
whose equivalence class by R¯A differ. Let us say these are k˜j and k˜j+1 , for some
j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , r} . Moreover, uk˜j + vµ(k˜j+1) = ak˜jµ(k˜j+1) for all (u, v) ∈ C(wA) , which
means that ar
k˜j k˜j+1
= ak˜j k˜j+1 . This implies, by Lemma 6, that k˜j and k˜j+1 belong
to the same class by the relation R¯Ar , that is, k˜jR¯Ar k˜j+1 . We are thus on the
assumptions of Case 1, that is, k˜j and k˜j+1 play the same role as i1 and i2 in Case
1, and thus we reach k˜jR¯Ak˜j+1 , in contradiction with the assumption. 2
By the above lemma, for all assignment games with the same core the equiva-
lence relation R¯A , and consequently the partition in equivalence classes, is the same.
Thus, whenever we want to analyze some core property of these markets in terms of
this equivalence relation, we can restrict to their buyer-seller exact representatives.
For this representative, the chained equal-partner relation coincides with the equal-
partner relation, which is already transitive. This is shown in the next corollary.
Corollary 9 Let (M ∪M ′, wA) be an assignment game with as many buyers as sell-
ers. Then R¯A = RAr , where (M ∪M ′, wAr) is the buyer-seller exact representative.
Proof: Take an arbitrary assignment game (M ∪ M ′, wA) , not necessarily with
doubly dominant diagonal. We have R¯A = R¯Ar = RAr , where the first equality
follows from Proposition 8 and the second one from Theorem 7. 2
A second consequence is that the statements of Lemma 5 are in fact characteri-
zations of the chained equal-partner equivalence relation.
Corollary 10 Let (M ∪M ′, wA) be a square assignment game and let R¯A be its
chained equal-partner relation on M . If i1, i2 ∈ M , then the following statements
are equivalent.
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1. i1R¯Ai2 .
2. ui1 − ui2 is constant in C(wA) .
3. ui1 + vµ(i2) is constant in C(wA) for all µ ∈M∗A(M,M ′) .
And similarly for the relation R¯′A on M
′ .
Proof: The implication (1)⇒ (2) is part (1) of Lemma 5. As for (2)⇒ (3) , notice
that if ui1−ui2 is constant in C(wA) then, for all µ ∈M∗A(M,M ′) , ui1− (ai1µ(i2)−
vµ(i2)) is also constant in C(wA) , which implies (3).
To see (3)⇒ (1) recall first that M∗A(M,M ′) ⊆M∗Ar(M,M ′) . Observe now that
if, for some µ ∈M∗A(M,M ′) , ui1+vµ(i2) is constant in C(wA) , then ui1+vµ(i2) is also
constant in C(wAr) . Since A
r is buyer-seller exact, we have that ui1+vµ(i2) = a
r
i1µ(i2)
for all (u, v) ∈ C(wAr) . Now, by Lemma 6, there exists µ′ ∈M∗Ar(M,M ′) such that
(i1, µ(i2)) ∈ µ′ . This means that µ′(i1) = µ(i2) and thus i1RAri2 . Finally, by
Proposition 8, we get i1R¯Ai2 . 2
A consequence of the above corollary is that all non-active agents on the same
side of the market belong to the same equivalence class. This happens because every
non-active agent has a constant payoff in the core.
Corollary 11 Let (M∪M ′, wA) be a square assignment game. All non-active buyers
(sellers) belong to the same equivalence class of the chained equal-partner relation R¯A
( R¯′A ).
Now we know that there is at most one equivalence class formed by non-active
agents on each side of the market, we denote by IA0 and J
A
0 the class of non-active
buyers and sellers respectively. Notice that IA0 and J
A
0 might be empty.
Finally, next theorem states that the dimension of the core equals the number of
equivalence classes formed by active agents on one side of the market. Recall that the
dimension of the core as a convex polytope C is the dimension of the minimal affine
variety, Aff(C) , in which it is contained. See Rockafellar (1970) for the definitions
and properties of convex sets.
19
Theorem 12 Let (M∪M ′, wA) be a square assignment game and let the equivalence
classes of R¯A be I
A
0 , I
A
1 , . . . , I
A
r , where I
A
0 is the (possibly empty) class of non-active
buyers. Then, dimC(wA) = r .
Proof: By Proposition 8, we assume without loss of generality that A is buyer-
seller exact. We will prove first that dimC(wA) ≤ r . Take any optimal matching
µ . For all (u, v) ∈ C(wA) and all (i, j) ∈ µ we have that ui + vj = aij . Thus
dimC(wA) = dimCM(wA) ≤ m , where CM(wA) is the projection of C(wA) to the
space of payoffs to the buyers. Moreover the payoff in the core of any non-active
agent is constant; this is, for all i ∈ IA0 , ui is constant for all (u, v) ∈ C(wA) . This
means that dimC(wA) ≤ |IA1 ∪ IA2 ∪ · · · ∪ IAr | , where recall that |IA1 ∪ IA2 ∪ · · · ∪ IAr |
stands for the cardinality of the set IA1 ∪ IA2 ∪ · · · ∪ IAr .
By Lemma 5, for all equivalence class IAk , k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r} , and any two agents
in this class, i1, i2 ∈ IAk , it holds that ui1 − ui2 is constant for any (u, v) ∈ C(wA) .
This implies dimC(wA) ≤ r .
To prove the converse inequality, take (u, v) in the relative interior of C(wA) .
Recall that x ∈ Aff(C) belongs to the relative interior of C , ri(C) , if and only
if there exists ε > 0 such that B(x, ε) ∩ Aff(C) ⊂ C , where B(x, ε) is the ball
centered at x with radius ε > 0 . Recall also that the relative interior of a non-empty
convex set is also non-empty. Then, since all assignment game has a non-empty core,
ri(C(wA)) 6= ∅ .
Since we are assuming that A is buyer-seller exact, by Lemma 6 we know that
a core constraint ui + vj ≥ aij is tight at all core allocations if and only if (i, j) ∈
IAk × JAk , for some k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r} . Then, (u, v) in the relative interior of C(wA)
means that ui > 0 for all i ∈M \ IA0 , vj > 0 for all j ∈M ′ \ JA0 and ui + vj > aij
for all (i, j) 6∈ ⋃rk=1(IAk × JAk ) .
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Now, for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r} take εk > 0 small enough such that the point
(uk, vk) belongs to the core, where
uki = ui + ε
k ∀i ∈ IAk ,
vkj = vj − εk ∀j ∈ JAk ,
uki = ui ∀i ∈M \ IAk ,
vkj = vj ∀j′ ∈M ′ \ JAk .
If we denote by conv{u, u1, u2, . . . , ur} the convex hull of the points u , u1 , u2, . . . , ur
of Rm , we have that CM(wA) ⊇ conv{u, u1, u2, . . . , ur} and thus dimCM(wA) ≥
dim conv{u, u1, u2, . . . , ur} . For all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r} , let wk be the vector in Rm
with origin in u and extreme point in uk , that is wki = ε
k for all i ∈ IAk and
wki = 0 otherwise. Then, dim conv{u, u1, u2, . . . , ur} is the rank of the set of vectors
{w1, w2, . . . , wr} and this is r . 2
As an application of the above theorem, consider the two markets with matrices
A1 and A2 introduced in page 8. In both markets the buyers-optimal core allocation
is (u, v) = (1, 1, 1, 1; 0, 0, 0, 0) and the sellers-optimal core allocation is (u, v) =
(0, 0, 0, 0; 1, 1, 1, 1) , as can be easily obtained from (1), (2) and (3). Thus, all agents
are active. The assignment game (M ∪M ′, wA1) has only one equivalence class (by
the chained equal-partner relation) on each side of the market. As a consequence it
has a one-dimensional core. On the other side, the chained equal-partner relation on
any side of the market defined by A2 has two equivalence classes. Then, the core of
the corresponding assignment game is two-dimensional.
Some more comments relating the dimensionality of the core with the position of
the optimal matchings on the assignment matrix are given in the next section.
6 Some concluding remarks
Some other straightforward consequences follow from the partitioned form of the
assignment matrix given by the equivalence classes. For instance, once fixed a set
of agents M ∪ M ′ , for all t ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m} , there exists a matrix A such that
dimC(wA) = t . That is, all possible dimensions are effectively achieved. To see
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that, you only have to built a m×m matrix with t non-zero diagonal blocks, each
diagonal block being a constant and positive matrix and all blocks out of the diagonal
being null.
Moreover, it may well happen that a submarket has a core with a dimension that
is higher than the dimension of the core of the initial assignment market. The reason
is that in general the submarket does not preserve the optimal matchings of the initial
market and thus the number of equivalence classes may increase.
We may also ask if there is any relationship between the number of optimal match-
ings and the dimension of the core. As a first answer we obtain that an assignment
market with all agents active is full dimensioned, that is dimC(wA) = m , if and
only if there is only one optimal matching. This happens because, if only one op-
timal matching exists, then each equivalence class is a singleton. Moreover, if the
optimal matching is not unique, then at least two agents will be related by the equal-
partner relation, and then the number of equivalence classes will be less than m ,
since at least one class will contain more than one agent.
As the dimension of the core decreases, its relationship with the number of optimal
matchings is not so tight. One could think that as the dimension diminishes, the
number of optimal matchings increases. But this is not exactly the case.
With only two optimal matchings, and assuming again that all agents are active,
the dimension of the core may take any value from 1 to m − 1 . To obtain an
assignment game with a core of dimension k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m − 1} you only have
to define a matrix with these two optimal matchings: µ = {(i, i) | i ∈ M} and
µ′ = {(i, i) | 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1} ∪ {(i, i + 1) | k ≤ i ≤ m − 1} ∪ {(m, k)} . Then the
equivalence classes on the set of buyers are IAr = {r} for all r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k − 1}
and IAk = {k, k + 1, . . . ,m} .
Thus, there is not a lower bound to the number of optimal matchings depending
on the dimension of the core. However, it is true that, as the dimension decreases
the upper bound for the number of optimal matchings increases.
To argue this assertion, notice that if the matrix has doubly dominant diagonal,
and once assumed that the agents on the same equivalence class are consecutive, all
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matching contained in the diagonal blocks is optimal. This is to say, all matching
µ ∈ MAr(M,M ′) such that for all (i, j) ∈ µ there exists k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r} with
(i, j) ∈ IAk × JAk is an optimal matching for Ar . Thus, the number of equivalence
classes of an assignment market (M ∪ M ′, wA) , together with the cardinality of
these classes, determines the number of optimal matchings of the buyer-seller exact
representative Ar , which is
∏r
k=1 |IAk |! . But the number of optimal matchings of the
initial market (M ∪M ′, wA) may be less than that.
Thus, for a given structure of the r equivalence classes,
∏r
k=1 |IAk |! is an upper
bound for the number of optimal matchings. Among all the markets with m agents
on each side and r equivalence classes, the maximum possible number of optimal
matchings is (m− r+1)! , which is attained at a doubly dominant matrix with r−1
singleton equivalence classes and another one with m− r+1 agents. Thus, when all
agents are active, an attainable upper bound for the number of optimal matchings
when the core is r-dimensional is (m− r + 1)!
Also, from a given structure of the equivalence classes, a lower bound for the
number of optimal matchings of (M ∪M ′, wA) can be deduced: for each equivalence
class IAk not reduced to a singleton, the submatrix A|IAk ×JAk must have at least
two optimal matchings. As a consequence, the result in Sotomayor (2003) is easily
obtained: if the core of a market with at least two agents on each side reduces to
only one point, then the optimal matching cannot be unique. The reason is that if
the core is zero-dimensional then all the agents on each side of the market belong to
the same equivalence class (the one formed by non-active agents), and this cannot be
achieved with only one optimal matching.
Finally, from the description of the equivalence classes of the transitive closure of
the equal-partner relation we can recognize when the kernel of an assignment game
coincides with the core. The kernel is another set-solution concept for coalitional
games with transferable utility which was introduced by Davis and Maschler (1965).
Taking into account that the kernel of an assignment game is included in the core
(Driessen, 1998), we know by Granot and Granot (1992) that the kernel of an as-
signment game coincides with the core if and only if there does not exist an agent
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with non-constant payoff in the core that is matched with the same partner in all
optimal matching. We can now say that this happens if and only if no equivalence
class formed by active agents is a singleton.
Corollary 13 Let (M ∪M ′, wA) be an assignment game with as many buyers as
sellers, and let {IAk }rk=0 and {JAk }rk=0 be its equivalence classes by the relations R¯A
and R¯′A , where I
A
0 and J
A
0 are the possibly empty classes of non-active agents. The
kernel coincides with the core if and only if |IAk | > 1 for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r} .
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